

8 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: 40 Committee Agenda Item: U-2's for
Civil Earth Surveys

1. The attached memoranda from the Secretariat of the 40 Committee describe two separate proposals for using the U-2C for earth resource survey programs: Tab A describes a domestic only program; Tab B an international program. Both are items for discussion at the forthcoming 40 Committee meeting.

2. Tab A describes a program already negotiated between NRO and NASA which would give two U-2C aircraft to NASA for domestic earth survey flight experiments to complement the NASA Earth Resource Satellite Program. This plan has been well staffed by NRO and has received the approval of the EXCOM. We recommend you support the program since we believe it will contribute to NASA objectives and we can find no political or security arguments against it.

3. Tab B describes a proposal for an international program which would use either U-2C or RB57F aircraft. This proposal should be considered separately from the domestic program and should be judged under the assumption that the NASA domestic program will proceed.

4. With regard to an international, civil application program using the U-2, there are two questions that seem to dominate:

(1) In view of the international reputation of the U-2 as a CIA operated "spy" airplane, is it likely that any foreign country would consider entering into a bilateral, open program with the US which included the use of these aircraft?

NASA review completed

NRO review(s) completed.

(2) If such a plan were approved and if bilateral programs with foreign countries were implemented, would the US be bound not to use U-2 for covert or politically sensitive intelligence operations for fear of jeopardizing the political reputation of those foreign countries with which we have negotiated an open program in good faith?


In our opinion the answer to the first question is generally no; it is likely that many countries would reject a bilateral open program using the U-2, although it might be acceptable to some. We believe the answer to the second question is generally yes: if such programs were negotiated and implemented, the US could feel less free to use the U-2 in a covert situation, because the consequences of disclosure would be potentially more serious.

5. In view of the low probability that such a program would be acceptable to potential foreign clients on one hand and, on the other, the risk to the viability of our reconnaissance capability if such a program were implemented, we recommend you vote against the proposal for an international program insofar as the use of the U-2 is concerned.

6. We can find no similar political or security arguments against using the RB-57F in an international program; however, in regard to the general appropriateness of the proposal we raise the question whether a specific plan has been generated which describes what photographic or other data collection operations would be offered to potential foreign clients and what basis the US has for believing that such data will yield resource information useful to the client country. We recommend you suggest the 40 Committee get such a report before approving the program.

7. There is an alternative approach you might suggest. After the NASA domestic U-2 program has gotten well underway and has established the usefulness of such a program, we might use it to probe the acceptability of the aircraft with foreign countries by making cautious advances to a carefully selected country, such as Canada, for example, for a cooperative program. If this proceeds without difficulty we might then consider making similar advances to other foreign governments. In this way the domestic program could go ahead immediately and as the situation and the acceptability of the plane's use becomes clear, proposals for international initiatives can be judged on a case by case basis.

8. In connection with the international program, the 40 Committee Secretariat has raised five additional questions which the committee members are asked to address. Attached is a paper which lists those questions and a recommended position or comment for each.



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Assistant Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachments: As Stated

CONCURRENCE:

Signatures
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

8 Mar 70
Date

The following questions are posed by the 40 Committee Secretariat as points of discussion at the 40 Committee Meeting. Our recommended comment follows each question in turn.

1. Would an unclassified aircraft survey program have an adverse effect on classified intelligence operations?

Comment: We believe that if the US entered into an agreement with a foreign country to use the U-2 for civil application purposes, the US would thereafter be somewhat deterred from using the U-2 for covert reconnaissance and, perhaps, any intelligence operations in a politically sensitive situation. Using the aircraft in such operations would expose our client countries to the risk that these operations might become public knowledge and thereby make these countries vulnerable to charges by other nations that they have been collaborating with the US on intelligence operations. We know of no similar arguments against use of the RB-57F.

2. What international problems would arise from cross-border photography if the adjacent countries have not developed a mutually agreed program?

It appears likely that adjacent countries would raise questions and perhaps objections to aircraft operations which had potential for photographing their territory. From a practical standpoint, adjacent countries would have to be a party to negotiations for such a flight program.



3. What limitations, if any, can be placed upon access to survey data? Completely open? Available to client country only?

Comment: It seems theoretically possible to negotiate arrangements which would allow only the client country to have access to the data. From a practical standpoint, however, this would seem viable only if it were obvious that the flight operations were able to photograph only the territories of the client country. If there were any possibility that photographs could be accumulated from adjacent countries it seems doubtful that such an agreement could be maintained.

4. Will it be possible to selectively declassify satellite photography to serve as a supporting data base for an aircraft survey program?

Comment: There is no way of selectively declassifying satellite photography of a foreign country without public admission of the fact of US photographic satellite reconnaissance, the fact that the US has been photographing non-Communist countries, and without revealing some aspects of products and technology. These admissions could lead to adverse reactions which might jeopardize the continued viability of the satellite reconnaissance program as well as cloud the future relationship of the earth resources satellite program. Current procedures for sanitizing information

collected by photographic satellites permit selective production of unclassified maps where the source and resolution capabilities of the system are not revealed and where there is a reasonable unclassified means for sourcing the information. Study would be required, however, to determine whether such sanitization could be made to contribute significantly as support for an aircraft survey program.

5. What are the implications and advisability of utilizing in this program the U-2, world-renowned as a "spy plane"?

Comment: These implications have been discussed in the basic memorandum.

